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SUMMARY
In its FY2004 budget proposal, the Bush
Administration requested $380 billion for the
Department of Defense, including $61.8
billion in Title IV Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding.  This
year’s RDT&E request is $5 billion more than
the amount available for RDT&E in FY2003,
and represents the largest single-year request
in constant dollars going back to FY1962.
The Administration also requested $66 million
in research and development within the De-
fense Health Program and $252 million for
research and development in the Chemical
Agents and Munitions Destruction Program.
According to the FY2004 budget, the Admin-
istration is planning to request $394 billion for
RDT&E through FY2009, with annual fund-
ing reaching $69.4 billion in FY2009.
The Administration’s request for the
S&T portion of the FY2004 RDT&E budget
was $10.2 billion.  This is $500 million below
the amount available for S&T in FY2003.
Through FY2009, the Administration esti-
mates it will request $66.2 billion for S&T.
After the initial drop this year, S&T would
steadily increase, although it would not reach
FY2003 levels again until FY2009, in con-
stant dollars.
The Administration requested $7.7 bil-
lion in research and development for missile
defenses, $1 billion more than what is avail-
able in FY2003.
The Senate voted to authorize $63.1
billion on RDT&E, including $10.7 billion on
S&T ($1.4 billion of which would go toward
basic research).  The House voted to $62.7
billion on RDT&E, including $10.7 billion on
S&T  ($1.3 billion of which would go toward
basic research).  The House voted to authorize
$7.8 billion in RDT&E for the Missile De-
fense Agency, the Senate voted to authorize
$8.1 billion.  The House voted to amend and
the Senate voted to repeal the decade-old
prohibition on research into low-yield nuclear
weapons.
The House voted to appropriate $64.6
billion for Title IV RDT&E ($11.9 billion for
S&T).  The Senate voted to appropriate $63.6





The House passed its defense appropriation bill (H.R. 2658) on July 8.  The Senate
amended it by substituting its version (S. 1382) on July 17.  
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Congress supports the research and development efforts of the Department of Defense
(DOD) with a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation.  The
appropriation primarily supports the development of the nation’s future military hardware
and software and the technology base upon which those products rely.  It is the federal
government’s single largest research and development account.  Besides supporting the
nation’s military needs, some of the technology developed with RDT&E funds spills over
into the commercial sector.  For these reasons, RDT&E funding draws a considerable amount
of attention within Congress each year.  
During the Clinton Administration’s tenure, Congress appropriated between $34 billion
and  $41 billion a year in RDT&E funding.  In FY2003, funding reached $57 billion.
Traditionally, almost 80% of the RDT&E funding goes toward the development and
demonstration of operational military hardware and software.  The rest, over $10 billion in
FY2003, goes toward basic research and more fundamental technology development and
demonstration, referred to as the Science and Technology (S&T) program.
Most of the RDT&E appropriation is provided for in Title IV of the defense
appropriations bills (Title II in the defense authorization bill).  However, over the last few
years, Congress has also provided RDT&E funds separately in two other accounts: the
Defense Health Program and the Army’s Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction
Program.  The Defense Health Program supports a wide range of activities, including
research in areas such as breast and prostate cancer.  The Chemical Agents and Munitions
Destruction Program supports activities to destroy the U.S. inventory of lethal chemical
agents and munitions to avoid future risks and costs associated with storage.  While this issue
brief tracks RDT&E funding in these other areas, most of the focus of the issue brief is on
those RDT&E funds provided in Title IV.    
  
Every year, Congress must review and approve or revise how much money the
Administration requests in  RDT&E funding and how that money is allocated.  This issue
brief tracks the evolution of the RDT&E budget from the Administration’s budget request
through Congress’s final authorization and appropriation (see Table 2), and discusses key
issues that arise.
Funding data presented in this issue brief are expressed as total obligational authority
(TOA), except where noted otherwise.  Total obligational authority is a budget concept used
by DOD that represents the value of the direct Defense program for a fiscal year.  It is
equivalent to the sum of all budget authority granted by Congress, plus amounts from other
sources authorized to be credited to certain accounts, plus unobligated balances of funds
from prior years which remain available for obligation.  Rescissions, transfers and other
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Figure 1. RDT&E (Title IV) FY2004 Budget
budget modifications affect TOA and budget authority (BA) differently.  Therefore, TOA and
BA differ by a few tens of millions of dollars when examining past year funding levels.
Budget requests are in terms of budget authority and Congress authorizes and appropriates
budget authority.   However, funding data for individual program elements and cumulative
RDT&E budget activities in DOD’s R-1 document (used by this issue brief as the primary
source of budget data in Tables 1 and 2) are reported as TOA.  To remain consistent, all data
in this brief are expressed as TOA, except where noted.  It should be noted that in the current
year (in this case FY2004), and beyond, BA and TOA for RDT&E are the same.  Differences
occur only when considering past year activities.
For a discussion of DOD’s overall defense authorization and appropriations bills in their
entirety, the reader is referred to CRS Report RL31805, Appropriations and Authorization
for FY2004: Defense. 
Total RDT&E Budget
The Bush Administration requested $61.8 billion in Title IV RDT&E funding for
FY2004.  This is about $5 billion more than the TOA available for RDT&E in FY2003.
Furthermore, the budget sets out a funding plan that would request $394 billion for RDT&E
through FY2009, with annual funding reaching $69.4 billion in FY2009. See Figure 1.
In addition to the $61.8 billion in Title IV RDT&E funding, the Bush Administration
also requested RDT&E funds for the Defense Health Program ($66 million) and the Army’s
Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program ($252 million).  In FY2003, these
programs received $457 million and $294 million, respectively.  The Defense Health
Program is where Congress places its appropriations for breast cancer, prostrate cancer and
other medical research of special interest.
Historically, RDT&E funding has reached its highest levels, in constant dollars, looking
back to FY1962 (Figure 2).  Prior to FY2003, RDT&E had peaked in constant dollars in
FY1987, at the end of the Reagan defense build-up.  After FY1987, RDT&E funding
declined over the next 8 years.  Funding leveled off in FY1995 and FY1996 before beginning
to rise again, relatively slowly.  The increases were due primarily to Congress appropriating
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Figure 2. RDT&E Funding Trend
increase RDT&E funding above requested levels, even during the first two years of the Bush
Administration.  FY2003 RDT&E funding surpassed the FY1987 level.  The FY2004 request
surpasses that, and the anticipated FY2005 budget request goes even higher.  It is unclear if
Congress will be satisfied by these budget requests.
In the past, the ability of Congress to increase RDT&E funding was constrained by the
1997 budget agreement which had set caps on defense spending.  Increases in RDT&E had
to come at the expense of other Department of Defense programs, or be declared as
emergency spending.  FY2000 was the first year Congress could increase defense spending
above the agreement’s caps by offsetting those increases with decreases in other non-defense
discretionary programs.  The constraint of budget caps subsided when the prospect of future
budget surpluses allowed DOD’s budget to increase, including RDT&E, without the need
to offset those increases.  The Bush Administration came into office indicating its intention
to provide even larger increases in defense spending and RDT&E.  However, prior to the
September 11 terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a tax cut and a
declining economy introduced new stresses into the budget environment.  Since
September11, budget deficits do not appear to be a major constraint as Members and the
Administration have expressed a willingness to provide whatever funds are deemed
necessary to meet the terrorist and other challenges.  Even the standard tensions within the
DOD budget, between RDT&E, Procurement, Operations, quality of life issues, readiness,
etc., which one might expect to be aggravated while the country is on a war-footing, do not
appear to be a constraint.  The Administration has signaled its intentions to request funding
for war time operations with supplementals and emergency funding. 
The House and the Senate have voted to authorize $62.7 billion and $63.1 billion,
respectively, for RDT&E in FY2004.   They have voted to appropriate $64.6 billion and
$63.6 billion, respectively.  In addition, both the House and the Senate voted to appropriate
$410 million in RDT&E for the Defense Health Program, including $85 million for prostate
cancer research and $150 million for breast cancer research.  The House also voted to
appropriate the full request for Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction; the Senate
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Figure 3. S&T Funding Trend
Science and Technology Funding
DOD’s RDT&E budget supports a wide range of activities, from basic research (e.g.,
atmospheric sciences) to the full scale development of large military systems (e.g., the F-22
fighter).  The RDT&E budget is accordingly divided into seven budget activities: basic
research, applied research, advanced technology development, component development and
prototypes, systems development and demonstration, management support, and operational
systems development.  DOD has designated these activities as 6.1 through 6.7, respectively
(see Tables 1 and 2 at the end of this issue brief).
Basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3)
together are referred to as DOD’s Science and Technology (S&T) program.  S&T projects
seek new ways of accomplishing tasks of military value and developing the underlying
scientific and engineering principles involved.  S&T projects are not directed at developing
specific operational weapon systems, although they may support such development by
solving specific problems.  Many of the weapon systems used with such effectiveness in
recent military actions can trace their origins to earlier S&T projects.  Besides developing
the technology base upon which future weapons systems rely, S&T programs (primarily 6.1
projects) help develop the future manpower expertise that DOD relies upon.  A large share
of university research in certain scientific and engineering disciplines (e.g. materials
engineering and math) is supported by the S&T program (especially 6.1 programs).  
S&T funding has followed a slightly different trend than overall RDT&E funding (see
Figure 3).  As total defense (and total RDT&E) spending started to decline in the late 1980s,
efforts were made to maintain S&T spending levels, especially 6.1 and 6.2 activities.  And,
in fact, funding for S&T generally increased over the next 6 years.  After FY1993, however,
S&T funding began to decline.  Over the next 6 years it fell back to FY1987 levels as
measured in constant FY2004 dollars.  The downward trend after FY1993 raised some
concern within the S&T community (including universities), especially since the Clinton
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Figure 4. Inflation+2% vs Appropriations/Budgets
Beginning in FY2000, Congressional action essentially reversed the downward trend.
Since then, Congress has added nearly $1 billion each year to the S&T budget requests.  The
Bush Administration has requested $10.2 billion in S&T for FY2004, nearly $500 million
below the TOA available for S&T in FY2003.  After this initial drop, the S&T budget would
again rise.  However, it constant FY2004 dollars it is not scheduled to reach the FY2003
level again until FY2009.     
Assuring adequate support for S&T activities is seen by some in the defense community
as imperative to maintaining U.S. military superiority.  But, because the time between
specific S&T projects and successful new operational systems is long and unpredictable, and
because it is difficult to calculate a return on investment for the S&T program as a whole,
it is difficult to determine what is a sufficient investment.  Those concerned viewed the
decline in S&T funding after FY1993 as a sign that DOD was under-investing in S&T.  The
FY1999 defense authorization bill (P.L. 105-261, H.R. 3616, Section 214) expressed the
sense of Congress that S&T funding between FY2000 and FY2008 should increase no less
than 2% above inflation per year, using the FY1999 request as the baseline.  The Clinton
Administration’s subsequent budgets made an effort to meet these goals in the budgets’
current year, but were never able to sustain the commitment into the out-years. However,
Congressional action has more than achieved that rate of increase over the last four years (see
Figure 4).  The F2004 Bush budget for S&T would also achieve this goal. 
During the Bush Administration, however, the S&T goal has changed.  In testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 5, 2001, then Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Pete Aldridge suggested that S&T
should receive between 2.5 percent and 3 percent of DOD’s total budget, based on the
percent of sales certain high technology sectors of private industry invest in research.  This
became official policy in the 2001 Quadrennial Review, released in September, 2001, which
stated that DOD planned to stabilize S&T funding at 3% of overall DOD funding.  A number
of Members have embraced this objective.  However, the Bush Administration’s FY2004
S&T budget request does not make the 3% goal in any of the next 6 years (see Figure 5).
Also, as the policy is stated, it would imply that should overall DOD budgets decline, S&T
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Figure 5. S&T as a Share of Total DOD
Spending
How much should DOD spend on S&T? The 2% plus inflation goal established by
Congress was essentially an arbitrary target.  The goal of 3% of DOD’s total budget is also
arbitrary, but is based, in part, on a June 1998 report by the Defense Science Board (DSB—
Defense Science and Technology Base for the 21st Century).  The report reviewed how firms
in several technologically sophisticated industries decide how much to spend on research.
The Board found that firms do not typically go through an objective analytical process to
determine how much to spend.  Instead firms rely more on subjective “rules of thumb” that
consider other investment needs, competitive pressures, etc.  The metric is generally
characterized in terms of investment as a percent of sales.  The Board recommended drawing
an analogy between sales revenue in the private sector and DOD’s overall budget and using
the pharmaceutical industry, which the DSB reported as having the  highest commercial
investment in research as percent of sales (3.4%), as a benchmark.
The DSB report argued that the pharmaceutical industry is an appropriate model for
deciding how much DOD should spend on S&T because it is considered a high technology
industry and that the competitiveness of firms depends on the ability to develop new
products.  But comparisons stopped there and the analogy may be inadequate.  For example,
the pharmaceutical industry is primarily  manufacturing oriented and revenues are generated
on the sale of products.  A large part of DOD’s mission and budget could be considered
service oriented.  If the pharmaceutical industry were also involved in delivery of services,
would its investment in research as a percentage of sales still be as high?   Perhaps only that
part of DOD’s budget devoted to acquisition should be used as an analog to pharmaceutical
revenues.  Also, the DSB report chose not to consider as part of DOD’s current investment
the amount DOD reimburses private contractors for independent research and development
(IR&D).  In 1997 (the last year for which figures were kept), DOD allowed defense
contractors to claim $2.7 billion in IR&D expenses considered relevant to DOD’s needs.
The DSB report suggested that this should not be considered since the results of this research
are not held solely by DOD.  Nor did the DSB report make any allowance for the fact that
the United States already significantly outspends its competitors (i.e. foreign governments)
in defense research.
The House and the Senate voted to authorize $10.9 billion and $10.7 billion,
respectively, for S&T in FY2004.  These figures represent roughly 2.8% of what they
authorized for DOD. The House voted to appropriate $11.9 billion for S&T while the Senate
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voted to appropriate $11.4 billion.  When compared to the total amount appropriated for
DOD, the Senate achieves the 3% goal and the House exceeds it (3.2%).
Ballistic Missile Defense
The Bush Administration has made major changes in the structure, funding, and
acquisition strategy for ballistic missile defense, including changing the name of the
organization from Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to Missile Defense Agency
(MDA).  The Administration has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
which for decades had put constraints on the development of ballistic missile defenses as part
of the overall strategic arms control strategy between the United States and the former Soviet
Union.  For a more thorough discussion of missile defense policies and issues, see For
Additional Reading  for other CRS products on the topic.
In 2001, the Administration proposed, and Congress went along with, a  reduction in
the number of program elements associated with the program as well as doing away with
programmatic distinctions between theater and national missile defenses (the Administration
envisions that theater and national systems will be melded into an integrated global system).
Consequently, RDT&E program elements are now divided along “functional” lines (boost,
midcourse, and terminal segments, with system integration, etc.).  The Administration also
promised to increase greatly the amount of funding devoted to ballistic missile defense.
Also, rather than follow a tradition acquisition approach, where a program heads toward
a definitive system architecture designed to meet specific performance criteria, the
Administration is proposing a new evolutionary approach (being called evolutionary
acquisition) where the final overall system architecture is not determined ahead of time but
will evolve as new elements contributing to the global capabilities are brought on line.  The
Administration also has floated a concept called capabilities-based management that it
intends to use with missile defense.  Capabilities management is less well defined than
evolutionary acquisition.  However, it appears to suggest deploying systems as capability is
demonstrated but without specifying ahead of time a rigid set of performance requirements
that must be met before deployment can begin.  Citing these conceptual models of
development as the reason, the Administration  suggests that it can no longer provide
Congress with much of the programmatic projections that the program has provided in the
past.  The Administration claims these projections were too constraining of development and
deployment and unreliable in any event.  Some Members have expressed concerns that
without this information there is no way for Congress to exercise its oversight
responsibilities.  The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 conference report (H.
Rpt. 107-772, pp 564-565) required the budget justification documents include performance
goals, development baselines, and funding profiles for each “block” of missile defense
system being considered for deployment and which have been designated as being of special
interest to Congress.  In addition, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is to
review the cost, schedule, and performance criteria for missile defense programs.
For FY2004, the Bush Administration requested $7.7 billion for the RDT&E part of the
missile defense program.  This is $1 billion more than the amount available for missile
defense RDT&E in FY2003.  The House authorized $7.8 billion for missile defense RDT&E,
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the Senate authorized $8.2 billion The House voted to appropriate $7.5 billion (choosing to
slow program growth).  The Senate voted to appropriate $7.8 billion.
The American Physical Society released a study on July 15, highlighting the technical
difficulties associated with boost-phase intercept.  The Missile Defense Agency is developing
an airborne laser for boost-phase intercept and is exploring ground-, sea-, and space-based
kinetic technologies.  The space-based kinetic boost-phase effort has been scaled back.  Both
the House and Senate voted to provide the Administration’s request for the airborne laser but
reduced the appropriation for the Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptor element of the
program.  The BMDS Interceptor element is seeking to develop boost-phase kinetic
technologies that could eventually be deployed to target ballistic missile at any stage of their
flight.  
Other Issues
RDT&E Within the Office of the Secretary
Last year, the Administration proposed transferring a number of RDT&E programs
(primarily S&T program) that have been managed by the Office of the Secretary (OSD) to
the Services.  The rationale for the proposal was to help meet staff and funding reductions
within the Office.  The programs ranged from the In-House Laboratory Independent Research
program (a program directed at supporting basic research within DOD laboratories) to the
Foreign Comparative Test Program (a program aimed at testing operational military systems
developed in other countries to determine their feasibility of meeting U.S. military needs).
OSD’s RDT&E portfolio ranges between $1 billion and $2 billion per year and supports
RDT&E programs across the full spectrum of activity (from 6.1 to 6.7).  It typically supports
programs whose technology could be applied across all of the Services or whose technology
the Services are reluctant to support themselves or whose applications don’t fit neatly into
any of the Services’ missions.  In some cases, OSD initiates these programs itself.  In other
cases, Congress has initiated the programs.
Last year, Congress balked at the transfers (see Section National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Conference Report, H. Rpt. 107-772 , p.552-553) and directed the
Secretary of Defense to stop the transfer of 10 specific programs.  The report also requires
the Secretary to notify and justify to Congress the transfers in a mandated report. 
In its FY2004 budget request, the Administration again is proposing the transfer of OSD
RDT&E programs, including some of those Congress did not allow to be transferred last
year, such as the High Energy Lasers (proposed transfer to the Air Force), and University
Research Initiative (proposed transfer to the  Navy).  Below is a list of programs OSD
proposes transferring in FY2004.
The Senate authorization bill requires that the University Research Initiative, the High
Energy Laser programs, and the Explosives Demilitarization Technology Program remain
in the Office of the Secretary.  The Senate also found that the report mandated above did not
provide sufficient information to justify the requested transfer of programs.  The Senate
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extended the reporting requirements for four years for those programs that have been
devolved whenever the current year’s funding requests is less than the FY2004 request.  The
House voted to permit the transfer, but monitor closely the execution of these programs by
the Services and the oversight of these programs by the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (within OSD).
List of Programs OSD Proposes to Transfer
Program Activity Receiving Service/Agency





Force Health Protection 6.1 Army
Defense Experimental Program to
Stimulate Competitive Research
6.1
Explosives Demil Technology 6.3 Army




High Performance Computing 6.3 Air Force
High Energy Lasers 6.1-6.3 Air Force
Physical Security Equipment Advanced
Development
6.3 Air Force, DTRA
Resumption of Research Into Low Yield Nuclear Weapons
Both the House and the Senate addressed a 1994 prohibition on the research and
development of low yield nuclear weapons.  The prohibition was enacted by Section 3136
in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160), and read as follows:
(a) United States Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States not to conduct
research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a
new low-yield nuclear weapon, including a precision low-yield warhead.
(b) Limitation.—The Secretary of Energy may not conduct, or provide for the
conduct  of, research and development which could lead to the production by the United
States of a low-yield nuclear weapon which, as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
has not entered into production.
(c) Effect on Other Research and Development.—Nothing in this section shall
prohibit the Secretary of Energy from conducting, or providing for the conduct of,
research and development necessary—
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(1) to design a testing device that has a yield of less than five kilotons;
(2) to modify an existing weapon for the purpose of addressing safety and
reliability concerns; or
(3) to address proliferation concerns.
(d) Definition.—In this section, the term “low-yield nuclear weapon” means a
nuclear weapon that has a yield of less than five kilotons. 
Section 1331 of the FY2004 defense authorization bill (S. 1050), as finally approved by the
Senate repealed the prohibition with some constraints.  It reads:
(a) Repeal.—Section 1336 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1946; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) is repealed.
(b) Construction.—Nothing in the repeal made by subsection (a) shall be construed
as authorizing the testing, acquisition, or deployment of a low-yield nuclear weapon.
(c)Limitation.—The Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering
development phase, or any subsequent phase, of a low-yield nuclear weapon unless
specifically authorized by Congress.
The House, in Section 3111 of its FY2004 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1588), voted
to amend Section 1336 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 to
read as follows: 
(a) United States Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States not to develop
or produce a new low-yield nuclear weapon, including a precision low-yield warhead.
(b) Limitation.—The Secretary of Energy may not develop, produce, or provide for
the development or production of a low-yield nuclear weapon which, as of November 30,
1993, has not entered production.
(c) Effect on Other Development.—Nothing in this section shall prohibit the
Secretary of Energy from conducting, or providing for the conduct of, development
necessary—
(1) to design a testing device that has a yield of less than five kilotons;
(2) to modify an existing weapon for the purpose of addressing safety and
reliability  reliability concerns; or
(3) to address proliferation concerns, including assessment of low-yield
nuclear weapons development by other nations that may pose a national security
risk to the United States.
(d) Definition.—In this section, the term “low-yield nuclear weapon” means a
nuclear weapon that has a yield of less than five kilotons.
The House continues to state in statute that the United States shall not develop or
produce low-yield nuclear weapons.  The Senate repealed the prohibition entirely, but made
any engineering development (i.e. 6.5 budget activity) or subsequent development activity
subject to Congressional approval.  It also specified that pursuing research and development
should not be construed as allowing testing, acquisition, or deployment.  Neither the House
version, nor the original prohibition, explicitly prohibited testing.  The Senate did not restate
the definition of “low-yield nuclear weapon.”  It should be noted, as well, that “engineering
development” is no longer the term of art used by the Department of Defense for 6.5 budget











Army     6,263     7,018     7,535 9,123 
Navy     9,596   11,379   13,631 14,107 
Air Force   14,313   14,479   18,561 20,336 
Defense Agencies   11,316   15,518   17,061 17,974 
 (DARPA)   (2,977)    (2,260)   (2,690) (2,954)
 (MDAa)   (6,208)    (6,910)   (6,719) (7,729)
Dir. Test & Eval        225        229        238 287 
Dir. Op.Test/Eval          35 
Total Ob. Auth. $41,748 $48,623 $57,026 $61,827 
Budget Activity
Basic Research (6.1)     1,287     1,350     1,417 1,309 
Applied Res. (6.2)     3,674     4,094     4,289 3,670 
Advanced Tech. Dev. (6.3)     3,972     4,430     5,067 5,253 
Advanced Component Dev. & Prototypes (6.4)     8,052   10,125   10,754 13,197 
System Development & Demonstration (6.5)     8,441   10,676   13,737 15,913 
Mgmt. Supportb (6.6)     3,342     3,646     3,106 3,028 
Op. Systems Dev. (6.7)   12,980   14,303   18,656 19,458 
Total Ob. Auth. $41,748 $48,624 $57,026 $61,828 
Other Defense Programs
Defense Health Program        432        457       457 66
Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction        105        202       294 252
Source:  FY2002 to FY2004 figures based on Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2004 RDT&E
Programs (R-1), February 2003.  FY2002 to FY2004 figures for Defense Health Program and Chemical Agents
and Munitions Destruction Program come from OMB’s FY2004 Budget Appendix, Department of
Defense–Military, RDT&E.  All other figures come from prior year R-1s and OMB budgets. Totals may not
add due to rounding.
a. Includes only MDA RDT&E.  Does not include procurement and military construction or missile defense
RDT&E in other accounts.




























Army 9,123 9,332 9,013 10,186 9,513 
Navy 14,107 14,343 14,590 14,666 14,886 
Air Force 20,336 20,549 20,382 20,704 20,086 
Defense Agencies 17,974 18,174 18,849 18,763 18,774 
 (DARPA) (2,954) (2,996) (2,889) (3,039) (3,101)
 (MDAa) (7,729) (7,790) (8,173) (7,478) (7,804)
Dir. Test & Eval 287 287 287 294 305 
Dir. Op.Test/Eval 
Total Ob. Auth. $61,827 $62,685 $63,121 $64,613 $63,564 
Budget Activity
Basic Research (6.1) 1,309 1,339 1,376 1,431 1,358 
Applied Res. (6.2) 3,670 3,939 3,817 4,383 4,084 
Advanced Tech. Dev. (6.3) 5,253 5,615 5,513 6,092 5,927 
Advanced Component Dev. and
Prototypes (6.4)
13,197 13,350 13,257 13,176 13,070 
Systems Dev. and Demo. (6.5) 15,913 16,193 16,463 15,950 16,330 
Mgmt. Supportb (6.6) 3,028 3.034 3,049 3,315 3,127 






Total Ob. Auth.c $61,828 $62,686 $63,123 $64,614 $63,564 
Other Defense Programs
Defense Health Program 66 66 66 410 410 
Chemic a l  Ag e n t s  and
Munitions Destruction 252 252 255 252 
Source: Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2004 RDT&E Programs (R-1).  Figures for Other Programs come from OMB’s
FY2004 Budget Appendix.  Remaining figures come from associated Committee reports.   
a. Includes only MDA RDT&E.  Does not include procurement and military construction or ballistic missile defense RDT&E in other
accounts.
b. Includes funds for Operational Test and Evaluation.
c. Total Obligation Figures may not be the same due to rounding.
d. Does not include an additional $5 million added to both the Air Force and the Defense-wide RDT&E accounts on the House floor.
Note: The names of the Budget Activities have changed to reflect changes in the terminology and procedures associated with acquisition
planning.  For example, 6.4 used to be called Demonstration and Validation and corresponded to the first phase of an acquisition program
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